In this paper we investigate the problem of a bank, which, due to the presence of capital requirements, needs to issue credit derivatives. Because of asymmetric information in the loan and credit risk transfer markets, banks face an adverse selection problem, sharpened by the fact that credit derivative contracts are not publicly observable. We show that high-quality banks can use CDO contracts to signal their own type, even when credit derivatives are private contracts. Also a menu of contracts with a …rst-todefault basket and a credit default swap conditioned to the default of the …rst asset, can be used as a signalling device. Moreover, this last menu of contracts generates larger pro…ts for high-quality banks than the CDO contract if the cost of capital and the loan interest rates are su¢ ciently high.
Introduction
Bank loans have usually been considered as illiquid assets. This is mostly explained by the private information banks have about the quality of their loans: since this information is not easily veri…able, potential buyers are reluctant to take risk on such assets.
The recent advent of credit derivatives, however, has provided banks with a whole range of ‡exible instruments for selling loans and transferring loan risk. For example, pure credit derivatives, such as plain vanilla credit default swaps (CDS) allow banks to buy protection on a single exposure or on a basket of exposures, portfolio products, such as Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO), enable banks to sell risks from their entire loan portfolio 1 . One main advantage of these new instruments over traditional forms of credit risk transfer is that their ‡exibility helps to mitigate informational problems.
In this paper we investigate the problem faced by a bank that, because of asymmetric information in the credit risk transfer market, needs to signal its quality, but, at the same time, it has to satisfy minimum capital requirements.
This problem is more interesting than it would appear at …rst glance because protection buyers cannot signal their own type by freely varying the quantity of insurance, which is a standard solution for an insurance contract. This is due to the fact that retaining a large portion of credit risk can be too costly because of the presence of capital constraints. Moreover, in line with current market practice 2 , we assume that credit derivatives trades are not made pubblic (i.e. credit derivatives are private contracts) so that the protection buyer cannot make a commitment to a speci…c partial protection level to signal its type. In fact, any protection buyer who purchases partial protection upon its loans with a protection seller can, at the same time, hedge the rest with another protection seller, without the …rst being informed.
The design problem is thus to choose a contract that balances the issuer's desire to transfer credit risk against capital cost that the bank faces if it retains part of the risk (cost of issuing new capital, or the opportunity cost of capital borne by allocating capital at risk 3 ) under the constraint that credit derivatives are private contracts.
Our goal is to study the di¤erent menus of contracts presented in the literature and traded in the market to solve the adverse selection problem and to …nd which one is preferable given: (i) the presence of capital constraints; and (ii) that credit derivative contracts are not publicly observable.
The overall structure of our model is roughly as follows. We assume that banks are of di¤erent types, and vary in their ability to screen borrowers. We further assume that there exist "high"type banks that are able to screen their borrowers and choose only "good"loans, and "low"type banks that are unable to do so. In our model there is a one-to-one relation between a bank's ability and the riskiness of its credit portfolio, i.e. banks of diverse type have di¤erent loan pools.
Protection sellers do not know the true type of the protection buyer (simply "the buyer"from now on), and therefore face an adverse selection problem. The bank the disclosure of …nancial guarantees, the total amount guaranteed through credit derivatives is disclosed, even if the bank does not make a more comprehensive disclosure of its position". 3 Returns on capital generated by allocating capital at risk to other risky activities.
is subject to minimum regulatory capital requirements. As frequently claimed in the literature, we assume that even for banks capital at risk is costly as a result of asymmetric information (see Dewatripont and Tirole (1993) and Froot and Stein (1998) ) or because of capital requirements (see Gorton and Winton (1998) ). This induces the bank to prefer to hold risk-free rather than risky assets even if it is risk neutral and to attribute a cost to the capital at risk required by loans.
The de…nition of minimum capital requirements is importantin our analysis.
Much of the initial activity in the credit risk transfer market was in response to inconsistencies in the regulatory framework for bank capital allocation (see Jones (2000)). In this paper we want to avoid this aspect and are concerned solely with capital requirements which prevent regulatory arbitrage and help to reduce the probability of bank default. The less intrusive capital adequacy rule suggested by regulators in pursuit of this objective is that banks hold a level of capital at risk at least enough to cover the Value at risk (VaR) of their risky portfolio, where VaR is the maximum unexpected loss of bank asset portfolio given a certain con…dence level 4 .
In order to solve the adverse selection problem, we consider a sample of contracts that have already appeared in the literature on security design. Namely, we concentrate on two di¤erent menus of contracts. The …rst is the CDO menu where the protection buyer transfers a portion of the risk of the portfolio in one or more tranches to the protection seller and retains the other portion. The key aspect of this mechanism is that the risk transferred and the risk retained are of di¤erent seniority and, usually, the protection buyer holds the equity tranche (i.e.
the most junior tranche). As DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999) show, the protection 4 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999, 2004) buyer's retention of the subordinate block reduces the total lemon's premium by creating an incentive to align its interests with those of the protection seller.
The second is a menu of contracts that is quite new in the literature of …nancial innovation and is based on a basket of loans characterized by di¤erent maturities:
a …rst-to-default basket and a plain vanilla credit default swap conditioned on the default of the …rst asset. The …rst-to-default basket is a …nancial contract in which the protection buyer pays a premium to the protection seller in exchange for a contingent payment by the counterpart if any of the underlying assets defaults.
A plain vanilla conditioned on the default of the …rst asset is a commitment to buy, at a …xed price, an insurance contract (a credit default swap) on the rest of the basket after the …rst default. For sake of simplicity, We call this menu of contracts the FTD menu. With an FTD menu, the bank is signaling its type by committing to buy "new"insurance in case of default and therefore showing that its credits have a low probability of default.
Our analysis yields several insights. First, if the cost of capital is relatively low, we show that the CDO contract may be extended to solve the adverse selection problem that arises from opacity and private credit derivative contracts. Second, the FTD menu is able to solve the adverse selection problem. Third, the CDO menu is not always the second best contract when credit derivatives are private contracts (as instead shown by DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999) in a framework with public observability of contracts). In fact, one of the main contributions of our paper is to prove that if the cost of capital and interest rate are su¢ ciently high, then FTD menu Pareto dominates the CDO menu. We believe that this last result is especially interesting, since it proves that theoretical predictions may vary according to whether credit derivative contracts are publicly observable or not.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the related literature. In Section 3 we present the basic model and we analyze the benchmark case with symmetric information. In Section 4 we consider the asymmetric information case. Section 5 concludes.
Related literature
The tremendous development in credit derivative markets has received the atten- Leland and Pyle (1977) pooling and sharing may be optimal when the protection buyer has superior information. They argue that the sharing process allows the protection buyer to concentrate the "lemon's premium" on the small …rst-loss or equity tranche and create a relatively large, low-risk senior tranche. Also, the protection buyer's retention of the subordinate tranche reduces the total lemon's premium by creating an incentive fot the buyer to align its interests with those of the protection seller. In our model we also consider this kind of contract design and derive the characteristics of this contract when a buyer cannot credibly commit to retain part of the risk because credit derivatives are private contracts, an aspect not addressed in the previous paper. 
The model

Assumptions
Let us consider a market where there is a bank (buyer) operating in the local loan market which may hedge its expositions in the OTC credit derivative market by selling credit risk to other banks (protection sellers). By de…nition, the OTC market is characterized by private contracts i.e. details of trades are not made pubblic.
Buyers and sellers are both risk neutral and, for simplicity, the riskless interest rate is zero. The (protection) buyer belongs to one of two di¤erent types: hightype (denoted by h) and low-type (denoted by l). Both types vary only with respect to the quality of their loan pools for the credit risk on which the bank seeks protection. The quality of the pools is assumed to depend on borrowers' 5 Moreover, Du¤ee and Zhou (2001) show that the mechanism proposed by Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) to reduce the moral hazard problem associated with the loan sales is broadly applicable to any mechanism that transfers loan risk outside of the bank, including credit derivatives. ability to repay loans. Since the probability of loan default depends on the ability of the bank to discern its borrowers, the buyer's quality can be represented by the probability that its borrowers repay loans. This probability is greater for a hightype buyer than for a low-type. Let p i for i = fh; lg be the probability of success for loans repayment, then 0 p l < p h 1, where p l and p h are the probability of loan success held by a low-type and a high-type buyer, respectively.
The model incorporates three dates: 0, 1 and 2. On date 0, the buyer makes two commercial loans with …xed size: I 1 and I 2 . I 1 matures on date 1 while I 2 matures on date 2. Both credit lines can default only at the maturity date and are uncorrelated. Making a loan of amount I a buyer i = fh; lg obtains an expected pro…t i = p i (1 + ) I I, where is the interest rate, which is the same for both types. Hence, sellers cannot infer buyers'types from the interest rate. 6 Moreover, we assume that 1; this assumption allows us to simplify our analysis greatly and in our opinion is su¢ ciently mild not to undermine the generality of our results. We assume that h > l 0 that is both types of loans have non negative net-present-value (NPV)). 7 The buyer is subject to capital requirements based on a VaR rule i.e. the bank's capital has to be at least equal to the amount of the largest unexpected loss which occurs with probability equal or lower than . We assume that p h < :
Therefore, in order to issue loans the bank has to hold a bu¤er of capital called capital at risk. In line with the literature mentioned above, we assume that there is an opportunity cost of capital > 0; this makes the bank's concern with risk management endogenous even if the bank is risk neutral.
Here we focus on the case in which banks use credit derivatives in order to reduce capital requirements and therefore the cost of capital. The credit derivative market we consider is characterized by the presence of di¤erent types of contracts.
At time 0, the buyer simultaneously o¤ers to purchase credit derivative contracts from the sellers 8 . Since there are many sellers, we assume that the buyer faces a competitive market. At the time of the proposal, the buyer's type is private information. Similarly, we assume that the buyer has full bargaining power and makes a take-or-leave-it o¤er to a seller.
The buyer may o¤er a number of di¤erent contract menus:
-two plain vanilla credit default swaps (CDS), both of which hedge against a single name, I 1 and I 2 (for sake of brevity, the CDS basket);
-a collateralized debt obligation 9 (CDO) on the portfolio I 1 and I 2 ; and an insurance contract to cover the counterpart's losses up to a certain amount L (the CDO menu);
-a …rst-to-default basket and a plain vanilla CDS contract over I 2 conditioned on the default of the …rst asset I 1 ( the FTD menu). The …rst-to-default basket is a …nancial contract in which the protection buyer pays a premium to the protection seller in exchange for a contingent payment by the counterpart if asset I 1 defaults.
In case of a default by I 1 the contract ends. The other contract in the menu is a commitment at time t = 0 to buy, at a …xed price, a plain vanilla contract on I 2 at time t = 1; conditional on the default of the …rst asset.
In our model, the credit event is identi…ed with a failure to pay at the maturity date. The credit event payment is de…ned as the di¤erence between the nominal value plus the accrued interest and the recovery value of the defaulted loan. For simplicity, we assume here that the recovery value is equal to zero, so that the credit event payment will be equal to the nominal value plus the accrued interest of each loan (I 1 (1 + ) in t = 1 and I 2 (1 + ) in t = 2). Moreover, all the cash ‡ows (including payment of the premiums) occur at the maturity of the contracts. Finally, let 0 < q < 1 be the percentage of high-quality banks among the protection buyers.
The benchmark case: symmetric information
When the buyer's type is common knowledge, then the lowest premium that a risk neutral seller is willing to accept, in order to hedge the credit risk of an amount I j (1 + ) by means of a plain vanilla contract is:
with i = h; l and j = 1; 2:
The expected pro…ts of a buyer of quality i = fh; lg are:
Since by assumption the NPV of the loans is positive for both types i = h; l, it follows that the capital requirement constraint is never binding. Hence, i (I j ) = I j i (I j ) with i = h; l and j = 1; 2:
The other possibility is that the protection buyer buys a CDS basket that covers both the loans. Given our assumption about correlation among loans, the premium that a risk neutral seller is willing to accept is simply:
It is straightforward to show that, with complete information, the full coverage CDS basket (as well as full coverage plain vanilla contracts) is a …rst-best contract.
Asymmetric information 4.1. Pooling equilibria.
In any pooling equilibrium the minimal premium that a risk neutral seller is willing to accept, in order to sign a plain vanilla contract that hedges the counterpart against the credit risk of the loan I j is:
Signing a full coverage plain vanilla credit derivative, a buyer of type i obtains the following expected pro…t:
As usual, it is easy to …nd the pooling equilibrium where both types of buyers sign the same contract in equilibrium. In particular, it is straightforward to check that there exists a pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium such that buyers of both types sign plain vanilla credit derivative contracts. The seller's beliefs are such that, if a full coverage plain vanilla contract (or a full coverage CDS basket) is o¤ered, the buyer is a high-type with probability q; if any contract di¤erent than a full coverage plain vanilla (or a full coverage CDS basket) is o¤ered, then the buyer is a low-type with probability 1: It is clear that high-type banks'pro…ts are lower than their pro…ts in a game with complete information and the lower the number of high-type banks in the market, the stronger is the incentive to signal their own type. We devote the next section to analyzing separating equilibria.
Separating equilibria
In this section we prove the existence of separating equilibria such that, at time zero, a high-type buys one of the two menus of contracts presented above and the low type buys full coverage plain vanilla contracts 10 . First we consider the two menus separately. Then we determine which separating contract is preferred by high-type banks; this depends on how the cost of capital, ; and the interest rate,
; vary. 10 We do not consider explicitly the plain vanilla credit derivative swap on a basket with partial coverage where the amount against which credit protection is held by the issuer is less than the amount of the credit exposure. This because we already know from DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999), and the same holds in our framework, that this type of contracts provide less pro…t to the protection buyers than the CDO contracts.
In order to overcome the multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria, we only consider separating equilibria which satisfy the intuitive criterion proposed by Cho-Kreps (1987) for a signalling game (denoted "CK perfect Bayesian equilibria"). Given that we employ this re…nement concept several times, it is worth giving an informal intuition of how it works. Consider that a buyer makes an out-of-equilibrium proposal and consider any conjecture that it has about how the seller reacts. If it happens that, given the seller's most optimistic conjecture (the seller believes that the proposer is high-type bank with probability one), a high-type bank …nds it optimal to deviate while the low-type does not, then the intuitive criterion imposes to assign probability 1 that the proposer of such a contract is a high-type bank.
First, we determine the conditions under which we have a separating equilibrium such that high-type banks choose CDOs to signal their own type. Later we consider the FTD menu.
Separating equilibrium with CDO
With a CDO contract the protection buyer sells its basket portfolio (I 1 ; I 2 ) to the protection seller and guarantees the payment, in case of default, of a fraction of the loss su¤ered by the buyer of the portfolio (the protection seller). We consider a small modi…cation to the CDO contract described above. In our contract the protection buyer pays L to the protection seller when the default of at least one loan occurs and the amount L does not depend on the size of the loss su¤ered by the protection seller. Given that both parties are risk neutral, a ‡at refund leads to the minimum size of loss that the high-type has to sustain in order to signal its own type. Therefore, this contract, minimizing the amount of the required capital, cannot be Pareto dominated by any other contract with variable payment.
In this section we assume that the buyer can o¤er to the seller either a plain vanilla, CDS basket credit derivatives or a CDO menu, but not an FTD menu of contracts. Importantly, as pointed out above, we assume that contracts are private, and therefore the protection buyer can hedge the equity tranche without the counterpart of the CDO contract being informed 11 .
; then there exists a unique CK separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium such that (i) high type banks sell (I 1 + I 2 ) loans in exchange of a …xed amount of money
and commit to pay a refund equal toL in case of default of any of the underlying assets;
(ii) low type banks sign full coverage plain vanilla or full coverage CDS basket credit derivative contracts at the fair price.
The counterpart's beliefs are such that if plain vanilla, CDS basket or a CDO with L <L are o¤ered then the buyer is a low-type with probability one. If a CDO menu with L L is o¤ered, then the buyer is high-type with probability one.
Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition behind this result is the following. A bank that sells its loans partially insures the buyer of the loan by committing to pay an amountL in case of default of any of the underlying assets. Since the probability of sustaining a default is lower for the high types than for the low-types, then there exists an amount of refund L such that low-types prefer to sign a plain vanilla contract, while hightypes prefer to sign a CDO menu. In the appendix we show that the minimum refundL which supports a separating equilibrium (and the unique one satisfying the intuitive criterion) induces a positive capital requirement. Therefore, the larger the cost of capital ; the smaller the pro…ts of a high-type bank when it signs a CDO menu. In particular, if
; then high-type banks also prefer to hedge the equity tranche and, in this case, there is no a separating equilibrium. If
; then a high-type prefers to incur the cost of capital rather than hedge the equity tranche. Low-types do not over-insure their exposure using both CDS basket and CDO menu (i.e. trying to mimic high-types) because the premium they receive for the refundL is lower than the fair value (they
if a low-type over-insures its exposition, it reduces its expected pro…ts 12 . As a result, our separating equilibrium does not require that a bank has not secretely hedged its portfolio using other contracts.
It is also worth noting that the refundL does not depend on the cost of capital (while the existence itself of the separating equilibrium does), because we assume that credit derivatives are private contracts. Since a bank can hedge the refundL without the counterpart being informed, the cost of capital does not enter the self selection constraint of the low type. On the contrary, it is easy to show that the penalty will depend on the cost of capital and is decreasing in this parameter if we assume that (i) the protection buyer could credibly commit ex-ante to retain the equity tranche risk and that, ex-post, this is incentive compatible or (ii) credit derivatives are public contracts. 12 Even the high-type bank is not over-insuring its portfolio using CDS basket because anyone buying that insurance is assumed to be a low-type bank.
Finally, note that under 13 Basel I in some jurisdictions CDOs are considered as a portfolio loan sales and banks face almost no capital requirement for holding the equity tranche (i.e. for this contract is almost equal to zero). It is straightforward to show that if = 0 for CDO menu then the high type bank is still able to signal its type by signing a CDO menu with L =L. In this case the CDO menu is a …rst best contract for the high-type (given the assumption of risk neutrality). This result may be one reason of why CDO contracts have experienced some success in recent years. Nevertheless, Basel II requires that all …rst loss positions must be deducted from a bank's capital 14 . Therefore, under Basel II, the cost of capital becomes positive ( > 0) and CDO contracts are no longer …rst best contracts.
Separating equilibrium with …rst to default contracts
In this subsection we show that high-type banks may also use the FTD menu of contracts to signal their own types. By signing an FTD menu, a high-type bank credibly signals its quality in a way that is distinct from signing a CDO menu.
In fact, in the last case the high-type bank sells its portfolio of loans and the signalling device is obtained by partially insuring the buyer of the portfolio in case of default. In the former case, the high-type bank buys protection and is therefore the insured party. Assuming that a protection buyer can only propose either an FTD menu or a CDS basket credit derivative contract, the following proposition holds:
; then there exists a unique CK separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium such that:
(i) high type buyers sign a …rst-to-default basket contract paying a premium 0;h (I 1 ; I 2 ) = (1 p l )(I 1 + p h I 2 )(1 + ); and a plain vanilla contract on I 2 conditioned on the credit I 1 default, paying a premium (1 p h ) I 2 (1 + );
(ii) low type buyers sign full coverage plain vanilla derivative contracts and pay the fair premium.
The seller's beliefs are such that the buyer is a high type bank with probability one if and only if it o¤ers an FTD menu with 0;h (I 1 ; I 2 ) ^ 0;h (I 1 ; I 2 ).
The premium paid at time t = 1 to hedge loan I 2 in case of I 1 default is equal to the fair premium for the high-types. In fact, we restrict our analysis to renegotiation-proof contracts. In a separating equilibrium only high-type banks sign an FTD menu. Therefore at time t = 1 in the case of I 1 default, there is complete information on the buyer type and therefore the unique renegotiationproof premium that the buyer pays to hedge asset I 2 is equal to (1 p h ) I 2 (1+ ):
16 15 This is a typical signalling device in the literature on asymmetric information. For instance, in Diamond (1993) a borrower can decide to execute an (ine¢ cient) short term contract in order to signal he is not afraid to turn again to the credit market. 16 We may have di¤erent separating contracts if the premium paid at time t = 1 can be larger than (1 p h ) I 2 (1 + ): But consistently with the assumption that the buyer has full bargaining The capital requirement induced by an FTD menu can be positive or zero, depending on the level of the interest rate. As we show in the appendix, if
; then pro…ts are large enough to pay the premium of the plain vanilla credit defauls swap on I 2 when I 1 defaults and therefore there is no capital
; a high-type bank which signs the FTD menu faces a positive cost of capital. Therefore, it chooses to not hedge the loss it faces in the worst state of the world (when I 1 defaults and it has to hedge again credit
and >
; the cost of capital is su¢ ciently high that high-type banks would prefer to hedge the unexpected loss. The high-type bank has no incentive to over-insure its portfolio issuing more than one FTD menu. To buy insurance is costly for a high type bank and therefore this strategy increases pro…ts only if in this way the bank reduces its capital requirements. For the same reason, the high-type bank has no incentive to over-insure its portfolio using a CDS basket. The e¤ect would be a reduction of expected pro…ts since anyone buying that insurance contract is assumed to be low-quality bank.
Low-type banks do not over-insure their exposition because the overall cost of purchasing any of the contracts (either CDS or FTD menus) is equal to their expected pro…ts. As for the CDO menu, our separating equilibrium does not require that outsiders know that a bank has not secretely hedged its portfolio using other contracts.
When a high-type bank buys an FTD menu, it commits to buy a plain vanilla contract at time t = 1 in case of default of the …rst asset. This commitment is power, we assume that these contracts would be renegotiated. If we assume that a buyer can commit at time t = 0 to pay a premium larger than (1 p h ) I 2 (1 + ) to the seller in order to insure I 2 in case of I 1 default, then there exists equilibria in which buyer's pro…ts are higher.
ex-post incentive compatible as a result of the continuous application of capital requirements, that is because of the presence of a capital requirement constraint also at date 1. The FTD menu is a costly contract for the high-type banks since they pay an insurance premium that is higher than the fair premium. In particular, the premium paid at time t = 0 is (1 p l )(I 1 + p h I 2 )(1 + ) while the fair premium of a …rst-to default contract is equal to (1 p h )(
Hence, an FTD menu is not a …rst best contract when = 0: Moreover neither the premium paid at time t = 0 nor the premium eventually paid at time t = 1;
depend on the cost of capital : Again, this occurs since we have assumed that buyers can privately sign credit derivatives and therefore the cost of capital does not in ‡uence the self-selection constraint of the low-type banks.
The equilibrium described in Proposition 4.2 is not unique if we enlarge the set of possible contracts that a buyer can o¤er to the seller. High-type banks, as we have shown above, can signal their own type using either an FTD menu or a CDO menu. Hence, it is worthwhile analyzing the conditions under which a high-type buyer would prefer to signal its own type by means of an FTD rather than a CDO menu.
Signalling contracts: a comparison
Assuming that a protection buyer can propose an FTD menu, a CDO menu or a CDS basket credit derivative contracts, the following proposition holds:
; then a high-type buyer prefers to signal its own type by drawing an FTD menu than by drawing a CDO menu of contracts.
The intuition for this proposition is the following. In proposition 4.2 we prove that if
, then the FTD menu does not induce any capital requirement. In contrast, in order to sustain a separating equilibrium, the CDO menu always induces a capital requirement . Therefore, only a¤ects the pro…ts of high-type buyers when they sign a CDO menu and not when they sign an FTD menu. It follows that there exists a cost of capital large enough to make the FTD menu more pro…table than the CDO menu for high-type buyers.
DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999) show that the CDOs are optimal contracts in presence of asymmetric information when contracts signed in the credit markets are publicly observable. We proved that CDOs still can be used to solve the adverse selection problem when banks have capital requirements and contracts are private. Moreover, as mentioned above, it follows immediately from Proposition 4.1 that the CDO menu is a …rst best contract when = 0: However, Proposition 4.3 shows that if and are high enough the FTD contract not only Pareto dominates the CDO contract, but also guarantees higher pro…ts to the buyers.
One potential criticism of our analysis is that our de…nition of VaR includes also intermediation margin (i.e. ) while it is not clear under Basel II if this element is included 17 . Nevertheless, as the following proposition shows, it is easy to extend our results to the case where VaR is the maximum total loss (i.e. expected and unexpected loss) of a bank's asset portfolio with a given con…dence level .
Proposition 4.4. If the capital requirement is based on the total loss, and:
then the high-type buyers prefer to signal their own type by signing an FTD menu than a CDO menu.
Proof. see the appendix.
In this case also the FTD menu induces capital requirements that are nonzero but lower than those for the CDO menu. Indeed, the maximum total loss is only the fair premium for hedging I 2 if I 1 defaults, i.e. the expected loss,
(1 p h )(1 + )I 2 ; for the CDO menu it is the penalty L and that is strongly related to both the expected and unexpected loss of I 1 and I 2 : Therefore, as before, it follows that there exists a cost of capital large enough to make the FTD menu more pro…table for high-type buyers.
Another potential limitation is that we consider credit derivatives that apply only to a basket of two loans. The extention to a larger basket will complicate too much our model and we prefer to leave this issue to furthere research. Nevertheless, we expect that our main idea holds even in a more general framework. The key point is that, as soon as the FTD menu has a capital requirement that is lower than the CDO menu, there exists a cost of capital that will make this menu of contracts better than the CDO 18 .
One case not explicitly considered in our analysis is when the low-type banks are able to select loans with a negative NPV. It is easy to show that even under this assumption the results will be qualitatively unchanged. More speci…cally, both FTD and CDO menus allow the high-type to signal. The only signi…cant di¤erence is that in any separating equilibrium the low-type banks do not fund loans with a negative NPV and do not enter the credit derivative markets.
A second case related to our analysis but not explicitly considered is the moral hazard problem that arises when the protection buyer signs a full coverage plain vanilla contract and therefore has an incentive to stop monitoring the borrower.
In our framework it is easy to show that with an FTD menu in which underling assets have di¤erent maturities the same conclusion does not hold necessarily. In fact, it is enough to assume that the probability of default of commercial loans may also depend on the intensity of the monitoring activity exerted by the bank that holds these loans in its portfolio. If a bank signs an FTD menu then, in the event of an asset default, it must sign another contract to cover the exposure of the remaining loans. Hence, if the cost of monitoring is not too high, the bank has an incentive to monitor the portfolio. It is straightforward to extend this result to the CDO menu.
Conclusion
A major concern of both policy makers and regulators is the e¤ect of credit derivatives on the performance of credit markets. We show that the existence of a credit derivative market together with capital requirements for credit derivatives induces an adverse selection problem because low-type banks may cover their exposure with credit derivatives. Hence, the introduction of a credit derivative market does not necessarily always bene…t the economy and increase social welfare.
The use of classical signaling contracts able to solve the problems that arise from the opacity of the loan portfolios of banks is precluded in such market because (i) the retention of a part of the risk increases banks' capital requirements and
(ii) credit derivatives are private contracts and are not explicitly made public by banks. This last point makes the use of contracts based on partial coverage more di¢ cult, because protection buyers are unable to commit to a speci…c level of protection that is ex-post incentive compatible.
To our knowledge this is the …rst paper in the academic literature to consider rigorously the implications for the design of credit derivatives contracts of these two characteristics: capital requirements and private credit derivative contracts.
Our main result is that, when the cost of capital is not too high, there may nonetheless exist a separating equilibrium where high-type banks signal their own type by signing derivative contracts, First, we show that a CDO menu is (still) a contract that solves the adverse selection problem, even if the buyer cannot commit itself to not hedge the risk by holding the equity tranche (because credit derivative contracts are private). Nevertheless, in our framework unlike DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999) CDOs are not always second best contract in presence of asymmetric information. In fact, our second contribution is to prove that if the cost of capital and the interest rate are su¢ ciently high, then an FTD menu Pareto dominates the CDO menu.
We believe that this second result is especially interesting for two main reasons.
First because it suggests a potential contract design that is able to solve the adverse selection problem when Basel II is implemented. Under Basel I we show that the optimal contract is the CDO menu because it is a …rst best contract.
Second, it shows that theoretical predictions may change whether credit derivative contracts are publicly observable or not. Since the assumption that contracts are not publicly observable seems much more plausible, our result suggests that the analysis of the presence of private contracts in the credit market may deserve further investigation.
High-type bank equilibrium pro…ts are:
4) The equity trancheL implies a positive capital requirements for the high-type if:
that is if:
which holds by assumption that < 1:
The high-type bank can also either hedge the equity tranche paying the premium as a low-type, or not hedge the equity trance and faces the cost of capital : High type prefers to not hedgeL if:
By (6.7) and the incentive-compatible constraint of the low-type, it turns immediately out that the incentive compatible constraint for the high-type is satis…ed.
It is easy to check that the equilibrium beliefs are consistent with the equilibrium strategies and the out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfy the intuitive criterion. Note also that in any separating equilibrium where the equity trance o¤ered by the high-type bank is equal toL >L, then there existsL L <L such that if a high-type deviates o¤ering a CDO contract with this equity tranche, then by the intuitive criterion a seller should assign probability 1 that the proposer is a high-type.
Proof of Proposition 4.2: The high-type buyer o¤ers a …rst-to-default contract which satis…es the following maximization problem:
Condition (6.10) is the participation constraint for the seller, and condition (??) is the incentive compatibility constraint for the low-type buyer. It is straightforward to note that the buyer wants to minimize the premium. Since the equilibrium is separating and the buyer has full bargaining power, at time t = 1 the premium paid to hedge I 2 in case of I 1 default is 19 :
that is:
which holds by assumption. Finally, we have to check under which condition, assumption (6.12) holds true. Substituting^ h (I 1 ; I 2 ) and h (I 2 ) in (6.12) we obtain the following condition:
(1 p l )I 1 + (1 p h p l ) I 2 p l (I 1 + p h I 2 ) = b : (6.16)
Equilibrium beliefs are consistent with the equilibrium strategies and out-ofequilibrium beliefs satisfy the intuitive criterion. For any separating equilibrium where the high-type o¤ers an FTD contract with ( h (I 1 ; I 2 ) ; h (I 2 )) such that h (I 1 ; I 2 ) >^ h (I 1 ; I 2 ) ; then there exists a deviating proposal ( 0 h (I 1 ; I 2 ) ; h (I 2 )) with h (I 1 ; I 2 ) > 0 h (I 1 ; I 2 ) ^ h (I 1 ; I 2 ) ;such that, by the intuitive criterion, a seller has to assign probability one that the proposer is a high-type bank.
Case 2: If condition 6.16 does not hold, then the low-type bank which deviates and signs a …rst-to-default contract, can draw up a credit derivative contract in order to hedge its position. Let X be the amount a low-type bank receives in case of credit I 1 default and (1 p l )X the premium paid in equilibrium to hedge X: Then, in order to not incur in the cost of capital, the low-type signs a credit derivative contract such that:
h (I 1 ; I 2 ) (1 p h )I 2 (1 + ) + X (1 p l )X = 0 (6.17) that is if: ; which holds by assumption. Finally it is easy to check that < 0 if and only if p h < 1:
Proof of Proposition 4.4: The new VaR de…nition based on total loss is not a¤ecting the second incentive-compatible constraint of the low-type (6.2) for the CDO contract and therefore the amount L that the protection buyer has to guarantee in order to signal its type is stillL: The same applies for the FTD menu; the premium paid for the FTD is^ h (I 1 ; I 2 ) and the premium paid for the plain vanilla conditioned on I 1 default is h (I 2 ) :
Under the new de…nition of capital requirement, the required capital for the FTD menu, (that is the maximum total loss) is:
V aR f td = h (I 2 ) (1 p h )I 2 (1 + ) (6.24) that is the fair premium on I 2 if the loan I 1 defaults. The required capital for a CDO is simply the equity tranche:
V aR CDO = L (I 1 + I 2 )(1 + ) (p h + p l ) (6.25) and it is easy to show that V aR f td < V aR CDO .
For the CDO menu we have that the high type prefers to not hedge the equity trancheL if: 
